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Characterization of State-Preparation Uncertainty in Quantum Key Distribution

Anqi Huang1,*, Akihiro Mizutani2, Hoi-Kwong Lo3,4,5, Vadim Makarov6,7,8, and Kiyoshi Tamaki9

  • 1Institute for Quantum Information & State Key Laboratory of High Performance Computing, College of Computer Science and Technology, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, People’s Republic of China
  • 2Graduate School of Engineering Science, Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-8531, Japan
  • 3Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering and Department of Physics, Centre for Quantum Information and Quantum Control (CQIQC), University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G4, Canada
  • 4Department of Physics, University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong
  • 5Quantum Bridge Technologies, Inc., 100 College Street, Toronto, Ontario M5G 1L5, Canada
  • 6Russian Quantum Center, Skolkovo, Moscow 121205, Russia
  • 7Shanghai Branch, National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at Microscale and CAS Center for Excellence in Quantum Information, University of Science and Technology of China, Shanghai 201315, People’s Republic of China
  • 8NTI Center for Quantum Communications, National University of Science and Technology MISiS, Moscow 119049, Russia
  • 9Faculty of Engineering, University of Toyama, Gofuku 3190, Toyama 930-8555, Japan

  • *angelhuang.hn@gmail.com
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Phys. Rev. Applied 19, 014048 – Published 18 January, 2023

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevApplied.19.014048

Abstract

To achieve secure quantum key distribution, all imperfections in the source unit must be incorporated in a security proof and measured in the lab. Here we perform a proof-of-principle demonstration of the experimental techniques for characterizing the source phase and intensity fluctuation in commercial quantum key distribution systems. When we apply the measured phase-fluctuation intervals to the security proof that takes into account fluctuations in the state preparation, it predicts a key distribution distance of over 100km of fiber. The measured intensity fluctuation intervals are, however, so large that the proof predicts zero key, indicating a source improvement may be needed. Our characterization methods pave the way for a future certification standard.

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Phys. Rev. Applied 19, 014048– Published 18 January, 2023
  • Received 30 May 2022
  • Revised 7 November 2022
  • Accepted 15 December 2022
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