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Using Cascade in quantum key distribution

Devashish Tupkary* and Norbert Lütkenhaus†

  • Institute for Quantum Computing, and Department of Physics and Astronomy, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1, Canada

  • *tupkary.devashish@gmail.com
  • †nlutkenhaus.office@uwaterloo.ca
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Phys. Rev. Applied 20, 064040 – Published 22 December, 2023

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevApplied.20.064040

Abstract

We point out a critical flaw in the analysis of quantum key distribution protocols that employ the two-way error-correction protocol Cascade. Specifically, this flaw stems from an incomplete consideration of all two-way communication that occurs during the Cascade protocol. We present a straightforward and elegant alternative approach that addresses this flaw and produces valid key rates. We exemplify our new approach by comparing its key rates with those generated using older, incorrect approaches, for qubit BB84 and decoy-state BB84 protocols. We show that, in many practically relevant situations, our rectified approach produces the same key rate as older, incorrect approaches. However, in other scenarios, our approach produces valid key rates that are lower, highlighting the importance of properly accounting for all two-way communication during Cascade.

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Phys. Rev. Applied 20, 064040– Published 22 December, 2023
  • Received 28 July 2023
  • Revised 6 October 2023
  • Accepted 11 December 2023
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